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HOW STATE AND CITY GOVERNMENTS DEAL WITH
RACKETEERING
Paul E. Lockwood'
Every American more than thirty
years of age is familiar with the pat-
tern of the old-fashioned civic "clean-
up." A reform wave would sweep the
community-usually after an expose
by a newspaper or a clergyman. A new
police chief would take office or a new
prosecutor would be sworn in. The
venerable journalistic fiction known as
the police "dragnet" would be spread.
All known criminals would be locked
up. Proprietors of horserooms and
street-corner handbooks would also be
arrested. They would put up bail and
close up the front door-but use the
back door. The floating dice games
would float no more. And the well
patronized establishments on the back
streets would put up the shutters and
their inmates vanish. The "lid" would
be on. The town would be all cleaned
up.
Such was the technique and the
formula for American municipalities
until the 1920's. We can trace back
through the years the perennial impulse
of communities to rid themselves of
corruption. We find the long path to-
word civic decency strewn with the
wreckage of "reform" administrations
and the bleached bones of the "re-
formers." Essentially these reform
movements represented the sporadic
efforts of society to deal with civic con-
IExecutive Assistant to Thomas E. Dewey,
District Attorney of New York County, 137
Center St., New York City.
ditions that normally were tolerated.
They were concerned with the illegaI
ventures of unorganized individuals,
with personal sin, if you will. And it
can scarcely be hoped that society can
eradicate sin. That we are told, is
original in man since the time of Adam.
But in the 1920's something new and
sinister rose in American life. Prohi-
bition brought with it the first great
organizing of crime-individual crime
-into syndicated crime.
It is not my intention to discuss the
problems of law enforcement with re-
spect to individual or casual violations
of the law. We are concerned today
with the organized violation of the
law, a phenomenon of the current gen-
eration-what has come to be known
as racketeering.
Racketeering is essentially a product
of our complex industrial society. It is
to be found primarily in our large in-
dustrialized cities. It has nothing to
do with the casual law-breaking which
is a problem in every community. This
is not always understood. Let me make
clear what is really meant by the term
"racketeering."
Racketeering is "the organized and
systematic extortion of money by
means of violence or fear from legiti-
mate business men and workers as
well as from illegitimate enterprises."2
2Thomas E. Dewey, Racketeering, Encyclo-
paedia Britannica, Book of the Year, 1938, p. 553.
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When prohibition was repealed, the
huge bootleg combinations which exist-
ed with the passive support or indif-
ferent opposition of the citizenry,
sought other fields. But long before
prohibition repeal, the criminal under-
world had its attention drawn to the
possibilities of industry as a .field of
exploitation. Underworld leaders had
been called in by one side or another
in industrial disputes to supply strong-
arm men.
Having once been invited in, the
gangsters saw the lucrative profits in
industrial disputes and decided to stay
in. Some, in fact, stayed in long
enough to take over the industries
themselves.
In New York City, for example, in
1935 the Special Prosecutor found fully
organized rackets maintained by or-
ganized underworld gangs in many of
the city's legitimate industries. Res-
taurants and cafeterias had been fully
"organized." The trucking industry in
the garment district was likewise "reg-
ulated." So was the distribution and
sale of flour, live poultry, fruits and
vegetables, baked goods, and many
other foodstuffs.
Then turning to illegitimate activi-
ties, the Special Prosecutor found
houses of prostitution organized into
a vast syndicate by one mob. Other
gangsters had seized the widespread
but unorganized lottery called "num-
bers." Its many small operators had
been beaten, kidnapped and coerced
until it had become one lucrative
racket.
While dealing with the subject of
illegitimate enterprises, it is important
to realize that you can never wipe out
racketeering in a community by con-
ducting anti-vice and anti-gambling
drives. These devices are productive of
quick results, impressive statistics,
headlines, and the approval of the "re-
form" elements.
But properly they are matters for
the police department, not the prosecu-
tor. The failure to stamp out such
social evils is the failure of a commu-
nity's social welfare and police agen-
cies. Yet since laymen and many law-
yers confuse rackets with problems in
public morals, the prosecutor is under
great pressure to intervene.
The prosecutor who attempts to sub-
stitute himself and his meager re-
sources for police inadequacies is in-
viting disaster for himself and providing
comfort for the racketeers.
Racketeering can be nipped in the
bud if honest law enforcement officials,
alert to the introduction of new meth-
ods and concepts in crime, are willing
to prosecute vigorously and promptly.
A racket does not appear full blown
in the midst of a city. It takes many
months of patient but unlawful work
to cultivate one. Hundreds of individ-
ual victims must be intimidated. It is
obvious that if the groundwork of a
racket is analyzed quantitatively, it
will be found to consist of large num-
bers of acts of simple assault, felonious
assault, mayhem, malicious destruction
of property, arson, kidnapping, coer-
cion, extortion and homicide.
It follows, when a racket is being
launched as a new venture, and it be-
comes necessary to break a victim's
head, that if the slugger is promptly
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sent to prison, the racket will die
aborning. What counts is the certainty
of arrest and conviction. Nothing de-
ters the racketeer's henchman except
the fear of prosecution every time he
commits an act in furtherance of the
racket. So it behooves the racket boss
to arrange that his men, if caught, be
allowed to walk out of the courtroom
as free men.
Procuring protection from prosecu-
tion is an essential step in the develop-
ment of a racket. The police depart-
ment is the first line of defense of the
community, the prosecutor's office the
second and the judiciary is the third.
If any one of the three is corrupt or
has rotten spots in it, the city is wide
open. Most vital is the prosecutor's
office. A racketeer once said to a news-
paperman: "Give me the District At-
torney and the other guys can have
the cops, the politicians and a couple
of judges."'
Accordingly, the racketeer casts
about for a potent political ally.
The alliance between racketeering
and corrupt politics is founded on the
rock of mutual self-interest. All
through the year the racketeer relies
upon the friendship of the dominant
political machine to secure for him and
his henchmen protection from prosecu-
tion. When primary day and election
day come, the racketeer performs his
part of their agreement. In addition to
generous cash contributions, he sup-
plies sluggers to terrorize honest men
and produce hordes of fraudulent
3Rupert Hughes, Attorney for the People,
Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1940, at p. 214.
4 Letter of Thomas E. Dewey, Special Prose-
voters to swell the vote totals of his
political allies.
The gorillas of the underworld, hav-
ing been invited to interest themselves
in the processes of the franchise, soon
learned the value of offensive and de-
fensive alliances with political bosses.
The more district leaders the rack-
eteer can control the greater his chance
of controlling the machinery of the
dominant political party of his com-
munity. That means controlling the
government of his community.
Few realize that in 1935 the island of
Manhattan, which is the County of
New York, was politically and crim-
inally divided into two spheres of in-
fluence. The County contains 23 politi-
cal sub-divisions, known as assembly
districts. In the area below 14th Street,
in which is located the heart of the
nation's financial community, Albert
Marinelli was a district leader. As the
Clerk of New York County he placed
the county seal on all official docu-
ments. One by one he was upsetting
district leaders by encouraging pri-
mary fights in his own party. It was
commonly conceded that he was the
strongest political factor in lower.Man-
hattan Island. He was also the "politi-
cal ally of thieves, pickpockets, thugs,
dope peddlers, and big-shot rack-
eteers."' He attended a national po-
litical convention with New York's
most dreaded gangster who, at the
time, was public enemy number 1.
This unsavory character was ruler at
the time of an underworld syndicate of
national proportions.
cutor, to Herbert H. Lehman, Governor of the
State of New York, re Albert Marinelli, New
York Times, December 12, 1937.
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What sort of people did this political
leader bring in to aid their fellow
townsmen in exercising the rights of
franchise? In sworn charges against
Marinelli filed with the Governor of
the State of New York, Thomas E.
Dewey alleged:
"Sixteen persons who have been
within the past years members of the
County Committee in the Marinelli
half of the Second Assembly District,
four others who have recently served
as inspectors of election therein, and
another who has been both a county
committeeman and an inspector of
election, making a total of twenty-one,
are ex-convicts, with one or more con-
victions for burglary, assault, picking
pockets, drug-peddling, and other
charges.
"Nine other county committeemen
and three inspectors of election, total-
ing twelve, have been arrested for
burglary, homicide, receiving stolen
goods, possession of drugs, and other
charges, but were not convicted."5
And the Deputy Commissioner of
Records appointed by Marinelli, at
$5,000 a year, was another ex-convict.
That was the condition below Four-
teenth Street.
North of Fourteenth Street there
was Dutch Schultz. He had prospered
in Bronx County running beer during
prohibition. Now he sought to extend
his criminal empire. He selected James
J. Hines, a flourishing political leader,
as his ally. Hines was strengthened by
Schultz's underworld treasury. His
political squads were augmented by
the legions of Schultz strong-arm men
5 Ibid.
6 People v. Hines (lst Dept. 1940), 258 App.
and terrorists. Hines rapidly became
the most influential political factor in
the northern part of the County.
There was testimony during the
Hines trial that the Dutch Schultz mob
made their headquarters in the Hines
political clubhouse on Election Day.'
They floated into the district large num-
bers of fraudulent voters. This was to
assure the election of the gang's candi-
date for District Attorney.
Hines uptown and Marinelli down-
town could influence the nomination of
judges and prosecutors. These nomina-
tions, because of the dominance of their
party machine, usually meant election.
Had Marinelli remained in office and
his political power been allowed to
grow; had Hines retained his influence
and continued as the political arm for
the Schultz mob, the underworld
through its two political allies, would
have been able to dictate the selection
of public officials of the wealthiest
county in the nation.
The ordinary citizen is apt to ask:
"Why don't the police do something
about racketeers?"
The answer is that, faced with politi-
co-criminal alliances such as these, the
ordinary police officer is helpless. He
is helpless not because of any fear of
physical retribution. He fears punish-
ment by his own superiors. Not pro-
tected by civil service, he could be dis-
charged. Where he is protected by
civil service, he can be given unpleas-
ant assignments, sent to posts far re-
moved from his home, and subjected
to bureaucratic intimidation.
Div. 466, aff'd October 8, 1940, N. Y. (Record
on Appeal, fols. 4484-9, 4960-9, 4971-2).
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As a result, many police officers fac-
ing a well-connected racketeer, find it
expedient to look the other way. A
clear demonstration of the whole vi-
cious system of "breaking" policemen
for doing their duty was given from
the witness stand in the Hines case.
7
Several plainclothes policemen persist-
ed in raiding Schultz's policy banks.
These raids were very costly to the
gangster. He became enraged and was
determined to "take care" of these
officers. Their names and shield num-
bers were passed on to Hines. The
county chairman of the dominant polit-
ical party testified that it was a regu-
lar part of his duties as such chairman
to receive requests for the transfer of
police officers and to pass them on to
the Police Commissioner. From time
to time he received such requests from
Hines. He stated that requests so
passed on by him were "invariably
granted." Before long the offending
police officers were walking a beat in
uniform.
Just as the blitzkrieg of modern war-
fare cannot be combatted by tradi-
tional military methods, so the attack
upon society by the rackets cannot be
smashed by the stereotyped formulas
of prosecution.
Racketeers are not nice people.
Fighting rackets is not a powder-puff
business.
Racket organization has many of the
characteristics of a pyramid. The base
consists of a large number of petty
criminals. The next layer above con-
7 Ibid. (Record on Appeal, fols. 2496-2510, 2565,
2645-52, 2658, 3902-10, 4061-7, 4079, 4166-73, 4213-6,
4263, 4270-81, 4349, 4948-9, 5735, 5745-6, 6062-5.
sists of a smaller group of specialists
and experts such as bomb makers, acid
throwers, saboteurs, arsonists and kill-
ers. Atop them is a still smaller group
of lieutenants--those with some but
limited discretion and authority. Above
are the trusted aides, the fixers, ad-
visers and renegade attorneys. Some-
where in the upper darkness is the
head of the combine, aloof and incon-
spicuous as possible.
The problem of proof is to* place
responsibility on the boss for the crim-
inal acts of the petty criminals at the
base of the structure. In the huge rack-
ets, most underlings have never seen
the boss, and are unable to recognize
him by sight or by voice. He lives on
a country estate or in a penthouse
apartment. Those few trusted retain-
er who actually are in contact with
him transmit his commands. In one
metropolitan racket a suggestion drop-
ped by a first rank subordinate to one
of the killers that "The boss doesn't like
so-and-so" became "so-and-so's" death
warrant.
Accordingly the prosecutor of rack-
ets has the long, unspectacular task of
working from the bottom. The smaller
fry are arrested, charged with what-
ever crimes they have committed. They
are made to realize that punishment,
swift and inexorable, is ahead. They
must be convinced that there is no hope
that arrangements for their release can
be made with corrupt law enforcement
officials. They must then realize that
cooperation with the district attorney
may win them some consideration at
the time of sentence.
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Usually one of the small fry breaks
down and agrees to turn state's evi-
dence. The prosecutor's next objective
is to get other defendants in the same
category to do likewise. The criminals
in the bottom layer then implicate
those on the next level. This process
must be repeated in each stratum until
evidence is obtained that will reach to
the top and convict the boss.
This layer-by-layer penetration of a
racket is in most state courts compli-
cated by corroboration statutes. Un-
like the Federal rule, many state codes
including New York,8 require that
the testimony of accomplices be cor-
roborated.
The state prosecutor's most difficult
problem in preparation of racket trials
is obtaining such corroboration. There
is no easy solution or magic technique.
Patient and repeated examinations of
accomplices are necessary. Careful
analysis and painstaking investigation
of their statements must follow. If in-
telligently directed, the persistence of
the attorney will bring out the neces-
sary corroboration if it exists.
Modern developments in organized
crime have made necessary a modern-
izing of state penal laws and procedural
codes. There was for instance a stat-
ute in New York which made it man-
datory for the court clerk to endorse
upon the indictment the names and ad-
dresses of all the people's witnesses be-
fore the grand jury." What better aid
to the friends and associates of the
sN. Y. Code Crim. Proc., §399.
9 N. Y. Code Crim. Proc., §271, repealed; see
fn. 9.
io N. Y. Laws; 1936, ch. 22, in effect Feb. 24,
racketeer? The legislature repealed the
statute in 1936.10
Also in 1936 the New York Code of
Criminal Procedure was amended to
try defendants at one time for crimes
committed by them which were con-
nected together and formed part of a
common scheme or plan." The earlier
rule requiring separate trials was a
particular boon to the racketeer since
it was then virtually impossible to
show to a jury the ramifications of
the racket and the crimes perpetrated
as part of the scheme. The New York
rule now follows the practice that has
been employed in the federal courts for
more than 70 years.
2
The city demanding racket elimina-
tion must be prepared to see racketeers
on trial assailed by the testimony of
their own accomplices. The public
must be prepared to accept such testi-
mony. For important racketeers com-
mit no overt acts directly. They only
scheme and give suitable orders. No
respectable testimony ordinarily is
available. The public must be pre-
pared for scorn and ridicule heaped by
defense counsel upon the prosecutor.
State witnesses will be villified and
abused. You will hear a clamor that
if men are to go to prison, it must be
on the testimony of honest men and
not scoundrels. The defense would re-
ject the testimony of other criminals,
even though fully corroborated by non-
accomplice testimony. The public must
take such criticism with a grain of salt.
1936.
21N. Y. Code Crim. Proc., §279- N. Y. Laws,
1936, ch. 328, §1, in effect April, 1936.
2 218 U. S. C. A., §557.
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Underworld conspiracies are not en-
tered into by honorable citizens. Crooks
and racketeers associate and deal only
with persons of their own ilk.
Unless co-conspirator testimony is
offered, underworld combines must be
allowed to continue-at least until
bishops and bankers are able to give
competent and material testimony at
criminal trials.
It is important that not only the
public but the underworld itself have
respect for the prosecutor and his in-
tegrity. Criminals know that if a pros-
ecutor is unapproachable, all stand on
parity and they abandon efforts to
make connections or bribe officials.
It is no less important that the prose-
cutor never tolerate third degree meth-
ods. Morally and legally this rule re-
quires no amplification.
The prosecutor must never, with
some very minor exceptions, promise
immunity to the defendant who wishes
to turn state's evidence. If it is done
generally, then no criminal wants to
testify unless he is given immunity.
The technique which many prosecutors
employ is to tell the criminal that when
his services to the state have been com-
pleted, the prosecutor will inform the
court about them and their value and
ask that they be given full considera-
tion in determining the sentence.
The criminal who has become a wit-
ness for the people must likewise have
absolute confidence that he will be pro-
tected from underworld reprisal. If
he is to go free, the prosecutor must
cooperate by furnishing protection, if
he wishes, or by sending him to remote
portions of the country, and where he
does not testify, by never making pub-
lic his indentity.
These may be called merely a few
tools of the trade. They illustrate, how-
ever, that there is something more to
the technique of racket prosecution
than is portrayed in the cinema. Little
is ever accomplished by the sirens, gas
bombs, machine guns, axe-squad raids
or other dramatic episodes.
The prosecutor must have the full
public support and sympathy of the
community he seeks to serve. If the
sentiment of the community is opposed
to the elimination of rackets the
chances of a successful job are almost
nil. The prosecutor must first prove
that he is entitled to public confidence.
When he has that confidence, he can
go ahead.
Experience has shown that the most
effective work is done quietly and un-
der cover. The prosecutor must avoid
announcing what and whom he is go-
ing to prosecute. The names of wit-
nesses, sessions of the grand jury and
subject matters of the investigation
should be kept secret until indictments
have been filed and the defendants are
safely under arrest. Then the commu-
nity is entitled to know the nature of
the charges, but the details of evidence
should .be saved for the court room.
The racket prosecutor must distin.
guish sharply between actual racketeer-
ing and popular misconceptions of
what constitutes a racket. As soon as
he takes office, it is safe to assume that
every labor dispute in the community
will be immediately presented to him
by one side or another. One group de-
scribes the demands of a union as ex-
tortion. The use of pickets is termed
*-h6
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a racket by employers and tremendous
pressure is brought to bear on the
prosecutor to intervene.
On labor's side the prosecutor is
urged to jail employers for hiring
strike breakers and for various other
grievances rising out of the friction of
the dispute. There is a difference be-
tween a series of crimes committed by
organized criminals masking behind the
front of a respectable labor organiza-
tion and the affirmative tactics em-
ployed by a labor union which are
legitimate, however unpopular they
may be with some elements in the com-
munity. This difference the prosecutor
must constantly bear in mind.
The prosecutor faces one of his
major problems in dealing with the
police department of his city, county,
or state. What is the department's at-
titude toward him? What will his at-
titude be toward the department?
These questions are of paramount
importance, since the mishandling of
the police can jeopardize an entire in-
vestigation. Of course if the police
force and its administration are
friendly to the prosecutor, progress is
relatively smooth. It is where they are
either hostile or neutral, that difficulty
is encountered. In some instances, the
difficulty is due quite naturally to po-
litical control of the police force. In
many cities and counties police are not
protected by civil service, or if -they
are, their top rank commanders are
not.
Even if the local administration and
the leaders of the police department are
friendly, the rank and file of the police
department have the power in' their
hands to hampersich an investigation
if they believe the prosecutor wants
only to use them to search for errors.
of brother members of the force.
In short, when a new prosecutor is
set up, this is the question which comes
to the minds of the policemen: "Is he
going to pick on the cops, or is he going
after the big shots?"
This attitude is understandable. It
derives from the days when police-
men were the first and usually the
only permanent victims of "clean-ups"
and reform waves.
Maintenance of a friendly relation-
ship with the police is therefore a ma-
jor objective. There is no substitute
for the policeman. He knows people
of his neighborhood or beat-knows
their daily lives and is in a position to
be of great help to the prosecutor. No
private investigator or agent, no matter
how well trained, no matter how adept
in scientific methods, can in any rea-
sonable amount of time acquire the
same detailed information which a po-
lice officer of experience possesses
about his neighborhood. The problem
of the prosecutor is to make that vast
and often unorganized knowledge avail-
able to him and his assistants.
At a time when the -world is con-
fronted with international lawlessness
on a scale never before witnessed, .dis-
cussion of the racket problem may seem
untimely. When the capitals of Europe
are being bombed to shambles, when
whole empires are tottering and the
fate of civilization itself is at stake, it
may to some seem strange that we
should concern ourselves with organ-
ized lawlessness in our own cities.
Should we stop to worry about deal-
ing"with the thug who is organizing.
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the push-cart peddlers, whe
are so concerned with the
organizing our whole nati
the threat of internationa
ism? But the two things ar
connected as they may at
Where the racketeer enjo
immunity, the public loses
democratic process. In the
menace of the racketeer, l
ment under a democratic sy
unable to move quickly.
The exasperated and unhs
of the racketeer too often
circumstances upon the in
of the democratic form of g
His impulse is to say: "If
Hitler or a Mussolini in tl
they'd clean out those racke
away."
The very fact. that rack
flourish in our great cities
alliance with political ma
creases this cynical attitude.
the victims of the rackets,
citizens tend to feel that
diseases are inherent in
The Theory of Deterrence, Retaliation
and Education:
"The deterrent theory, which is es-
pecially favored by jurists and states-
men (among philosophers by Schipen-
hauer), stands in an interesting relation
to the theory of retaliation and the
theory of education ...
"But the theory of education and the
deterrent theory are both directed to
the end which must necessarily be
aimed at in relation to transgressors
of the law. Both must be united in a
perfect theory of punishment. The
n our minds Nor are the dictator countries back-
problem of ward in using this idea in their propa-
on to meet ganda. The United States is consist-
I gangster- ently painted by them as a nation of
e not as un- lawless elements in which gunmen, ex-
first seem. tortionists and thugs swagger about the
streets while a decadent form of gov-
faish a n te eminent shows itself helpless to dealfaith in the
face of the with the problem.
aw-enforce- The fearless and efficient stamping
tm seems out of racketeering can be a potent
force in restoring faith in the sound-
ness of democratic government. So long
appy victinm as gangsters can be free to enter into
blames his great combinations to terrorize and
iadequacies prey upon honest citizens, so long as
overnment. political machines in alliance with such
we had a gangsters are able to continue in office,
is country just so long will the morale of the com-
eteers right munity suffer from the discouragement
of its citizens. In the world crisis con-
:eteers can fronting us today, public morale is one
in corrupt of the most important elements of na-
tchines in- tional safety. The prosecutor who dem-
Not merely onstrates by deeds that the corrupting
but other elements can be rooted out has made
such civic a lasting contribution toward maintain-
democracy. ing the morale of democracy.
punishment will then at once be effec-
tive in changing the character of him
who is punished and be an example
of the fact that the rules of law must
not be broken. The individual who is
punished will thus appear at once as
end and as means . . the decisive
standard for the perfection or imper-
fection of the essence of punishment
will yet be obtained from the degree
in which success has been reached in
combining education and determent.'-
Harald H~iffding: "The State's Au-
thority to Punish Crime."
